Ginet on A Priori Knowledge: Skills and Grades

Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 54 (2):32-40 (2009)
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Abstract

2. Ginet envisages a person’s fully understanding ‘what the sentence p says’ – which is the person’s fully understanding ‘what is said by one who utters p in normal circumstances in order to assert that p’ (p. 3). The understanding involved is direcError: Illegal entry in bfchar block in ToUnicode CMapted at meaning. It is one’s ‘understanding the parts and the structure of the sentence’ (ibid.). In the next section, I say more about the details of such understanding. First, though, here is how it can help to constitute p’s being self-evident simpliciter (p. 13)

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Stephen Hetherington
University of New South Wales

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[Letter from Gilbert Ryle].Gilbert Ryle - 1932 - Philosophy 7 (26):250 -.
From knowledge to understanding.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 199--215.

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