Kant on the Subjective Conditions of Moral Performance
Dissertation, Yale University (
1996)
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Abstract
In recent years, scholars have put forth a formidable defense of Kant's views on moral motivation. Their common goal has been to disclose the emotional dimension of his practical philosophy, an aspect of his thought arguably concealed by a couple of centuries of wrongheaded criticism. Yet a systematic study of the subjective factors that underlie moral performance as Kant understood it was missing. This dissertation tries to fill that gap. I reconstruct his theory of moral performance since 1755, and show why he ends up developing views that have aroused so much criticism. I share many of those criticisms and ask: Why do we have to assume that pure reason has driving mechanisms of its own? In order to answer this question, I focus first on what he calls the aesthetic preconcepts that make the mind susceptible to concepts of pure duty, and conclude that he does not succeed in showing a convincing connection between the moral law and the feeling of respect. Moreover, the theory that he puts forth to overcome this difficulty--the fact of reason--proves to be even more unsatisfactory. Problems beset his view of conscience as well. I show that the conception of the self that supports his definition of conscience is vulnerable to the change of self-deception. I finish with an examination of the religious beliefs that keep moral interest alive, but my conclusion is once more not favorable to Kant. Those beliefs seem to have no power for accomplishing the function that he has reserved for them. It could even be argued that they are intrinsic to the process of self-deception