Dennett y qualia

Cuadrante Phi (2001)
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Abstract

This text consists in the exposition of Daniel Dennett’s position on te "problem of qualia". Supposedly, the qualia are the qualitative properties that conform the conscience; a pain, the memory of a sticky sensation, a sticky sensation, the green color of the mountains I see, etc. In permanent opposition to the so-called qualophillians, an antiintuitive but coherent theory is developed, that operates through a form of reductionism.

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