Rationality and the Problem of Scientific Traditions

Dialectica 32 (1):3-28 (1978)
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Abstract

SummaryThe clash between rationalism and humanism presupposes a radical and optimistic view of reason, with science taken as the archetype. Popper's theory of reason as critical of tradition seems to offer a new direction. But Kuhn's discovery that scientists normally are uncritical of some basic ideas makes it vacuous. An improvement upon Duhem's analysis of tests gives us a new epistemology, however where viable alternative views which are not believed nevertheless influence the organization of research. The tacit debate can be regarded as an organized escape rather than as progress towards the Truth.We can thus admit tradition in science, and maintain that it is rational, even if scientists might be agreed on some basic issues during some periods

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Jagdish Hattiangadi
York University

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Paranoia and reinforced dogmatism: Beyond critical rationality.Abraham Rudnick - 2003 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (3):339-350.

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