Abstract

Karl Popper attempted to solve what he called "the two fundamental problems of epistemology"--the problems of induction and the demarcation of science and metaphysics. The discovery of a metaphysical component in science placed his criterion of demarcation in jeopardy because it is not clear how one can evaluate this component in terms of Popper's conception of scientific progress. The theory of research programmes, offered by Lakatos and Laudan, attempts to solve this problem by marrying the views of Popper and Kuhn. On this view, paradigms consist of substantive rules which regulate scientific research. Because rules are conceptual entities, and not tacit, Lakatos and Laudan maintain that research programmes can be evaluated, thereby avoiding the charges of irrationality raised against Kuhn's conception of science. ;The difficulty with the theory of research programmes concerns the rules themselves. Commitment logically requires behavior in accordance with the rules of a research programme, but scientists constantly break rules and get away with it. Moreover, the treatment of rules by Kakatos and Laudan presupposes that rules enjoin an uncritical response from scientists; i.e., they encourage scientists to turn a blind eye to anomalies. A consideration of the pragmatic features of language, however, indicates that rules can be considered tentatively or taken as conjectures. If this is so, there is nothing compelling about rules which obliges a Kuhnian response to anomalies. The attempt to wed the views of Popper and Kuhn, therefore, must be considered a failure