Abstract

Immanuel Kant offers a cogent doctrine of morals and implausible doctrines of politics and history. He presents a principle of moral action that coincides with deeply held moral intuitions, and he claims to derive that principle from human beings' nature as free, rational beings. At the same time, he defends an inflexible and profoundly questionable vision of politics, a vision he views as entirely consistent with that moral doctrine. ;This thesis makes two arguments concerning these claims. First, I contend that these two parts to Kant's view are essentially linked in Kant's thought. Second, I contend that Kant's view, though irremediably flawed, is superior to those of contemporary Neo-Kantians. I conclude that Kant's position constitutes the best available defense of rationalist morality and politics, but that in the end such a position is indefensible. The failure of Kant's practical philosophy forces one to view with great skepticism attempts to ground conceptions of moral and political obligation that rely upon no substantive account of the human good. ;Chapter One offers a partial defense of Kant's moral philosophy. The aim is to show how and why Kant's is an attractive position. Chapter Two presents an interpretation of Kant's political and historical thought, indicating how it emerges from and remains consistent with his views on the nature and justification of moral principles: while Kant's thinking on politics and history is beset with difficulties, that thinking follows directly from the premises underlying his moral philosophy. ;The next two chapters take up arguments of Hegel and Jurgen Habermas, each of whom offers a powerful criticism of Kant. I argue that their criticisms, while finding wide resonance in the literature on Kant, are largely unfounded. ;The failings of these criticisms suggest a return to Kant. The final chapter attempts to show that a rationalist morality that abstracts from ends, such as Kant's does, must rest upon an indefensible understanding of human practice