Formalism in Kantian Ethics from a Schelerian Perspective
Abstract
The aim of this paper is examining the issue that whether Kant's ethical thought, as Scheler and some other philosophers have claimed, is formalistic. Here, after explaining the meaning of formalism and history of this kind of critique of Kant, we try to show his formalistic view in ethics through considering some of the basic concepts of his ethical thought, such as absolute good, duty, categorical imperative, and autonomy of the will. It has been said that Kant's focusing on universal form of moral law and neglecting material aspects, contents, objects and ends of the actions imply his formalism in ethics. Furthermore, referring to the relationship between formalism and teleology in Kant's ethics, some commentators, through regarding human being as the end in itself, has been claimed that Kant somewhat modifies his formalistic view; but since his teleology cannot be interpreted as in usual sense, which is a form of consequentialism, his ethical thinking remains formalistic. Finally, we explain Scheler's approach to Kant's ethics and their similarities and differences. Scheler agrees with Kant that the foundation of morality must be universal, unconditional and a priori, and that morality or immorality of action cannot depend on its consequence; but he disagrees with Kant's conclusion that the material contents of the moral experience plays no role in morality or immorality of action. Indeed, this disagreement depends on the difference between Scheler's phenomenological approach and Kant's rationalism in ethics.