The moral supervenience thesis is not a conceptual truth

Analysis 73 (1):62-68 (2013)
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Abstract

Virtually everyone takes the moral supervenience thesis to be a basic conceptual truth about morality. As a result, if a metaethical theory has difficulties respecting or adequately explaining the supervenience relationship it is deemed to be in big trouble. However, the moral supervenience thesis is a not a conceptual truth (though it may be true) and as such it is not a problem if a metaethical theory cannot respect or explain it.

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Gerald K. Harrison
Massey University

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