Problems for moral/natural supervenience

Religious Studies 47 (1):73 - 84 (2011)
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'Everyone agrees that the moral features of things supervene on their natural features' (Smith (1994), 22). Everyone is wrong, or so I will argue. In the first section, I explain the version of moral supervenience that Smith and others argue everyone should accept. In the second section, I argue that the mere conceptual possibility of a divine command theory of morality (DCT) is sufficient to refute the version of moral supervenience under consideration. Lastly, I consider and respond to two objections, showing, among other things, that while DCT is sufficient to refute this version of moral supervenience it is not necessary



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David Alexander
Huntington University

References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction.Michael J. Loux & Thomas M. Crisp - 1997 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Thomas M. Crisp.
The myth of non-reductive materialism.Jaegwon Kim - 1989 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63 (3):31-47.
Moore, Morality, Supervenience, Essence, Epistemology.Nick Zangwill - 2005 - American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2):125 - 130.

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