Is God the Necessary Being?

Quaerens Deum 3 (1) (2017)
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Abstract

This paper briefly presents and engages with four competing hypotheses as to the most plausible explanation for the beginning of the universe. After clarifying some terminology, I will first establish both scientific and philosophical reasons for accepting the notion of an absolute beginning over a past eternal universe. Next, I will interact with Lawrence Krauss’ two versions of “nothing” and speculation of a multiverse as possible suggestions for what that first cause might be. In response, I will demonstrate the logical inadequacy of this approach, and by extension all other non-metaphysical theories. Ultimately, I will determine that, due to the logical contradictions inherent in physical explanations, one is epistemically justified in postulating a metaphysical deistic God as the Necessary Being responsible for the material cause of the universe.

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