Abstract

Most philosophers have regarded Hume as a skeptic about the existence of substance, causation, personal identity or mind, and external objects. Through analyzing perception, logical processes, and the logical difficulties arising from them, Hume concludes we have no logical right to believe in the existence of these things. In contrast to his negative analysis there follows, however, Hume's puzzling acceptance of these as real metaphysical entities. ;Hume's pattern can be understood if we explain his metaphysical views as due to a fideism, the acceptance of some reality or doctrine on an irrational or nonrational basis, as faith is sometimes advocated as a way of accepting religious beliefs and statements held not to be acceptable rationally. ;The thesis that Hume disposes of metaphysical doctrines on the basis of rational analysis only to accept them back on irrational grounds is supported by a three-step argument. The first is the claim that this fideistic pattern appears clearly in his philosophy of religion. Fideism is particularly germane to religious matters since as a word it conveys a dependence on faith. ;The second step in the argument shows that the fideistic pattern of Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion is repeated in Book I of his Treatise of Human Nature and in parallel passages in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. The use of rational analysis to discard and of human nature, habit, custom, propensity, etc. to retain metaphysical doctrines is essentially a fideism on secular issues. ;The third step consists of two parts: Hume's fideistic general statements on method, skepticism, and belief, and the use of Richard Popkin's reinforcing analysis of the modern Pyrrhonist tradition which urged a fideistic acceptance of all beliefs. Pierre Bayle, a powerful influence on Hume, best illustrates this, for he supports the use of faith for nonreligious matters. ;So, it is argued, Hume is a fideist in his metaphysical doctrines. Such a view best explains the puzzle of Hume's contradictory views, his return from a skeptical position to common sense conclusions, and provides a unifying approach to Hume's philosophy.