Even Adversarial Agents Should Appear to Agree

Abstract

Descriptors: coordination, autonomy, actions, beliefs Abstract Distributing authority among autonomous agents can induce inconsistency costs if the agents act as if they disagree. If we define an agent’s “marginal beliefs” to be the odds at which it is willing to make bets, we find that a betting market can induce agents to act as if they almost agree, not only with respect to the bets they offer but also other actions they take. In a particular “Mars mining” scenario, I explicitly show how utility maximizing agents, who are autonomous and hence distrust each other, can discover a common consensus and take concrete physical actions as if they agreed with that consensus, lowering costs to the group as a whole. Though limited, the approach has also has many unexplored possibilities. A previous version of this paper was presented at the IJCAI-91 Workshop on Reasoning in Adversarial Domains (This version is missing some cites and the graphics.)

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