Abstract

In this dissertation, I investigate whether a choice can be coerced as a result of institutional policies facing the chooser, rather than the intentional threat issued by another person as the traditional model of coercion has it. In order to answer this question, it is first necessary to construct a careful and rigorous definition of that "traditional model," what I call interpersonal coercion. The definition at which I arrive is based on the core features of a coercive interaction and denotes the phenomenon of coercion and only that phenomenon. In the course of constructing the definition, I show why each constituent thereof is necessary and why current usage of the term is both confused and potentially dangerous for the concept. ;I then apply the concept of interpersonal coercion to a contemporary problem in moral, legal, and political philosophy--that of institutional policies and their effect on those subject to them. In particular, I construct a method by which one can differentiate between policies whose requirements may put the person subject to them in a difficult spot, but which are nonetheless legitimate, on the one hand, and those which make illegitimate demands on the chooser on the other. I do this by examining in detail three Supreme Court cases involving policies which condition the allocation of desired goods on the fulfillment of certain requirements. I then apply the definition of interpersonal coercion to such cases, and conclude that what I call institutional coercion can indeed take place under very specific circumstances. ;Finally, I review the moral, political, and legal consequences of a finding that a policy is an instance of institutional coercion. I argue that such consequences are grave and consequently that it is absolutely necessary to have a principled definition of institutional coercion with which to adjudicate the many claims made with regard to the coerciveness of such policies