Abstract

Adam Smith has long been regarded as a champion of sympathy. More recently he has also been regarded as a critic of love. But how do these two sides of his thought cohere? This article argues that Smith’s defense of sympathy emerges directly out of and is indeed decisively shaped by his critique of love. Yet seeing this requires reconsidering what Smith understood love to be, as well as what he understood sympathy to be. What follows thus offers a reexamination of Smith’s well-known treatment of eros alongside an examination of his underappreciated treatment of agape in order to argue for the claim that Smith’s theory of love is not simply a critique of eros for its particularity but also incorporates an appreciation of the attractions of the universality of agape. At the same time Smith ultimately judges agape insufficient as a remedy for eros, for however admirable its scope and ambitions may be, the realization of its ambitions, Smith thinks, is compromised by our natural epistemic limits. It is this recognition, I want to argue – and not his reservations towards eros alone – that leads Smith to regard sympathy as a central principle of motivation, and to embrace it as the best available means of replicating the practical benefits of universal charity within the confines of our epistemic limits.