Synthese 197 (1):233-247 (2020)

Authors
Line Edslev Andersen
Aarhus University
Abstract
Mathematicians often intentionally leave gaps in their proofs. Based on interviews with mathematicians about their refereeing practices, this paper examines the character of intentional gaps in published proofs. We observe that mathematicians’ refereeing practices limit the number of certain intentional gaps in published proofs. The results provide some new perspectives on the traditional philosophical questions of the nature of proof and of what grounds mathematical knowledge.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-1778-8
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References found in this work BETA

The Role of Trust in Knowledge.John Hardwig - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (12):693-708.
Why Do We Prove Theorems?Yehuda Rav - 1999 - Philosophia Mathematica 7 (1):5-41.
The Derivation-Indicator View of Mathematical Practice.Jody Azzouni - 2004 - Philosophia Mathematica 12 (2):81-106.
Reductio Ad Absurdum From a Dialogical Perspective.Catarina Dutilh Novaes - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2605-2628.

View all 20 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Non-Deductive Methods in Mathematics.Alan Baker - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
On the Contemporary Practice of Philosophy of Mathematics.Colin Jakob Rittberg - 2019 - Acta Baltica Historiae Et Philosophiae Scientiarum 7 (1):5-26.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

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