Weighted sets of probabilities and minimax weighted expected regret: a new approach for representing uncertainty and making decisions

Theory and Decision 79 (3):415-450 (2015)
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Abstract

We consider a setting where a decision maker’s uncertainty is represented by a set of probability measures, rather than a single measure. Measure-by-measure updating of such a set of measures upon acquiring new information is well known to suffer from problems. To deal with these problems, we propose using weighted sets of probabilities: a representation where each measure is associated with a weight, which denotes its significance. We describe a natural approach to updating in such a situation and a natural approach to determining the weights. We then show how this representation can be used in decision making, by modifying a standard approach to decision making—minimizing expected regret—to obtain minimax weighted expected regret. We provide an axiomatization that characterizes preferences induced by MWER both in the static and dynamic case.

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Joseph Y. Halpern
Cornell University

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The Theory of Statistical Decision.Leonard J. Savage - 1951 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 46:55--67.
A Rule For Updating Ambiguous Beliefs.Cesaltina Pacheco Pires - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (2):137-152.

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