Abstract

This essay is a philosophical exploration of the nature and value of forgiveness. It is divided into two parts. Part I is concerned with the question "What is forgiveness?" After rejecting models of forgiveness explicating it in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, I suggest a more fruitful approach focusing on what people mean when they use the term. I claim that there is a paradigmatic use for the application of the term and examine, in detail, what this entails. Along the way, I examine those concepts with which forgiveness is related but from which it is distinct. ;Part II is concerned with the question of whether and to what extent forgiveness is a virtue. I begin by arguing that we ought to resent wrongdoers when they have caused us injury and that failure to do so betrays a lack of self-respect. This being so, we ought not to forgive those who have wronged us. However, where a wrongdoer has repented the wrong he has caused us, the reason for resentment no longer obtains. Consequently, I conclude that forgiveness is permissible when directed at the class of repentant wrongdoers