Abstract

My purpose in writing this dissertation is to elucidate an implied theory of two levels of knowledge and their philosophical import enunciated in the Eastern dialectical spiritualism of Samkara and Western Idealism of F. H. Bradley. Discussion of knowledge has been an important aspect in Samkara's as well as in Bradley's philosophies. However, neither of them consider epistemology as an independent area of inquiry rather as part of their metaphysical discussions. They both were interested in reality and knowledge regarding it. That is to say, they were searching for a justifiable explanation of knowledge, by virtue of which all facts and experiences become intelligible. ;We find that neither Samkara nor Bradley explicitly discussed about two levels of knowledge. Hence my method is to follow various quotations from the writings of Samkara and Bradley, in order to construct an implied theory of two levels of knowledge in their philosophies. Although most of the quotations to be discussed in each case has been mentioned with reference to their relevance to the question of knowledge and epistemology, their necessary connection with metaphysics is unavoidable. ;The structure of the work reflects the importance of Samkara's as well as Bradley's criticisms against other schools of thought followed by the discussion of three basic philosophical questions. The questions are on: definition of knowledge, criterion of knowledge and means of knowledge. Each of these analyses is then followed by an explication of this particular influence which their respective positions have on their implicit conclusions on two levels of knowledge. ;With reference to the first question we find that they have used the term 'knowledge' in two different senses. Two different senses of knowledge which could be explained as two levels of knowledge. In the primary sense of the term, knowledge stands for pure knowledge which is devoid of any subject-object distinction. To be precise, in this sense, knowledge according to Samkara and Bradley, is intuitive knowledge where 'knowing' and 'being' are at one. In the secondary sense of the term, I shall explain that 'knowledge' stands for knowledge of 'something'. That is to say, knowledge in this sense for Samkara and Bradley is discursive knowledge. ;With reference to the second question, the criterion of knowledge, both Samkara and Bradley show an incredible similarity. Non-contradiction, as they proclaim, is the criterion of knowledge and reality. However, whereas for Samkara, the criterion is mainly a metaphysical principle, for Bradley, it seems to be logical. With reference to the third question on means of knowledge, both Samkara and Bradley seem to be advocating the importance of thought as well as intuition. ;It is my chief contention in this dissertation, to find the ground on which Samkara and Bradley establish their justification of knowledge. We find that, whereas Samkara finds his justification in the concept of 'Brahman' or 'consciousness', Bradley finds his in the concept of the 'Absolute'