Abstract
In his article ‘The Structure of Emptiness’, 467–80. doi: 10.1353/pew.0.0069[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]) Graham Priest examines the concept of emptiness in the Mādhyamaka school of Nāgārjuna and his commentators Candrakīırti and Tsongkhapa from a mathematical point of view. The approach attempted in this article does not involve any commitment to Priest's more controversial dialethic Mādhyamaka interpretation. The purpose of the present paper is to explain Priest's sketchy but very insightful interpretation of objects as non-well-founded sets in greater detail. Some problems concerning his idea to model the Mādhyamaka claim of the emptiness of emptiness by means of this kind of framework will be noted. Moreover, we will also discuss the possibility to represent the Mādhyamika's denial of the existence of irreducible constituents of empirical reality within a well-founded system of set theory. Finally, some slight mistakes in Priest's mathematical construction need to be pointed out.