Abstract

In the contemporary philosophy of religion literature there has been a resurgence of interest in the Christian doctrine of hell. The principal issue of attention concerns whether the doctrine can be formulated in such a way as to render it less susceptible to the following two criticisms: The doctrine of hell is immoral. The doctrine of hell is inconsistent with the putative nature of God. Hence, three types of defenses of the doctrine of hell are offered in the contemporary philosophy of religion literature. First, there are what I call Rejection Defenses; second, there are what I call Character Defenses; finally, there is what I call the Sin Defense. For the contemporary defenders, hell is not a place of fire and brimstone. The damned do not exist in a state of perpetual torment, continually receiving the wrath of god. Rather, hell is conceived as a self-chosen condition of exile from God; the goods of which the damned are deprived are the presence of God himself and the heavenly community. God is not be blamed for the condition for the damned. The damned are free to choose between union with God and alienation from him. When the choice of alienation form God is made by the damned, God treats them in a manner that is completely consonant with his moral perfection. As a result, the contemporary defenders of the doctrine of hell believe that the doctrine is both consistent with God's nature and morally sound. ;It is the intent of this dissertation to add to the philosophical analysis of the doctrine of hell. More specifically, it is to argue that each of the defenses in the contemporary philosophical literature overlooks certain significant features of belief and justice that, when taken into account, present a formidable criticism of each of the defenses. Thus, in the dissertation I demonstrate the inadequacies of the contemporary defenses of the doctrine and suggest that no construal of the doctrine---neither the traditional nor the contemporary accounts---escapes the difficulties that I introduce