Abstract

This paper assumes that the argument for the existence of localized character traits is correct and explores whether a virtue ethical theory can be grounded in localized traits. The central claim is that the localized traits can be evaluatively integrated under thick ethical concepts. The attempt to ground a type of virtue ethics in localized character traits in terms of thick concepts is new. Philosophers who have previously attempted to take seriously the experimental evidence have tended to argue for some sort of more globalised traits that are also compatible with the evidence. One category includes wider traits specific to domains or social settings instead of narrow situations. Other philosophers accept the evidence for localized traits but argue that it is possible for an individual to actively widen or group these traits. The view we will consider differs because it does not require us to attempt to widen the local traits that Doris (2002) finds to be empirically adequate, but to take the traits as the foundations of a virtue ethical theory. The causal, psychologically real traits will be the localized traits identified by Doris, but the ability to evaluatively integrate such traits will retain the thick ethical discourse characteristic of virtue ethics. Such evaluative integration is necessary for identification of which local traits to cultivate and the management of situations in which we find ourselves.