The transmission of knowledge and garbage

Synthese 197 (7):2867-2878 (2020)
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Abstract

Almost everyone will grant that knowledge is often transmitted through testimony. Indeed, to deny this would be to accept a broad-ranging skepticism. Here is a problem: Knowledge seems to be transmitted right along side lots of garbage. That is, besides transmitting genuine knowledge, we manage to transmit lots of beliefs that are irrational, superstitious, self-deceiving, and flat out false. So how is that possible? How is it that the very same channels manage to transmit both knowledge and garbage together? Call this “the garbage problem”. Part One of the paper explicates the problem in more detail and argues that the problem seems unsolvable by some familiar approaches to testimonial knowledge. Part Two presents and begins to defend a solution. The general idea is to treat the garbage problem as a generality problem.

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John Greco
Georgetown University

Citations of this work

The significance of epistemic blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):807-828.
The Ethics and Epistemology of Trust.J. Adam Carter, and & Mona Simion - 2020 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Is There a Duty to Speak Your Mind?Michael Hannon - 2024 - Social Epistemology 38 (3):274-289.
Certainty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.Giovanni Tuzet - 2023 - Contemporary Pragmatism 20 (4):398-423.

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References found in this work

Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Mind 93 (371):450-455.
How to defeat opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:137-49.
Relying on others: an essay in epistemology.Sanford Goldberg - 2010 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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