Abstract

The title already announces Henrich’s methodological reorientation, from the trajectory von Kant bis Hegel, to a constellation of post-Kantian theoretical philosophies comprehended as “three comparable and competing positions [those of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel] that cannot be reduced to each other”. Chapters 1 through 3 provide the context for the later content of the work by introducing the theme of the formal interdependence of mind and world, of “internal experience” and our experience of a law-governed world external to us. This co-relation Henrich understands as fundamental to both Kant’s own and post-Kantian philosophy, theoretical and practical. Henrich takes as basic “the insight that mental activity always implies a world within which such activity occurs.” This yields the claim that “the concept of mind as the subject of knowledge is not possible without the idea of a world that laws govern”. Henrich then adumbrates the ways in which Kant’s account of the structure and dynamics of this relation were taken to be either problematic or insufficient in theoretical philosophy between Kant and Hegel.