In Defense of Psychologism About Reasons

In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 33-50 (2016)
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Abstract

What we belief with justification, we generally believe for a reason. But what are epistemic reasons? In this paper, I defend psychologism about epistemic reasons against two important challenges.

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Martin Grajner
Technische Universität Dresden

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