A pragmatic modification of explicativity for the acceptance of hypotheses

Philosophy of Science 51 (1):120-127 (1984)
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Abstract

The use of a concept called "explicativity", for (provisionally) accepting a theory or Hypothesis H, has previously been discussed. That previous discussion took into account the prior probability of H, and hence implicitly its theoretical simplicity. We here suggest that a modification of explicativity is required to allow for what may be called the pragmatic simplicity of H, that is, the simplicity of using H in applications as distinct from the simplicity of the description of H

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Citations of this work

Decisions with indeterminate probabilities.Ronald P. Loui - 1986 - Theory and Decision 21 (3):283-309.

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References found in this work

Probability and the Weighing of Evidence.I. J. Good - 1950 - Philosophy 26 (97):163-164.
The Nature of the Chemical Bond.Linus Pauling - 1941 - Philosophy of Science 8 (1):133-133.
Corroboration, explanation, evolving probability, simplicity and a sharpened razor.I. J. Good - 1968 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):123-143.
The philosophy of exploratory data analysis.I. J. Good - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (2):283-295.

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