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The Ordinary Concept of Knowledge How
In Tania Lombrozo, Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy , Vol. 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 104-115 (2018)
Abstract
We present experimental results that support the claim that the folk concept of knowledge how is an epistemological hybrid, encompassing both intellectualist and praxist elements.Author Profiles
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Author Profiles
Citations of this work
Knowing how as a philosophical hybrid.Chad Gonnerman, Kaija Mortensen & Jacob Robbins - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11323-11354.
Authentic and Apparent Evidence Gettier Cases Across American and Indian Nationalities.Chad Gonnerman, Banjit Singh & Grant Toomey - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (2):685-709.
Subject-specific intellectualism: re-examining know how and ability.Kevin Wallbridge - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1619-1638.
The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy.Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (eds.) - 2023 - Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.
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