Anonymous assertions

Episteme 10 (2):135-151 (2013)
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Abstract

This paper addresses how the anonymity of an assertion affects the epistemological dimension of its production by speakers, and its reception by hearers. After arguing that anonymity does have implications in both respects, I go on to argue that at least some of these implications derive from a warranted diminishment in speakers' and hearers' expectations of one another when there are few mechanisms for enforcing the responsibilities attendant to speech. As a result, I argue, anonymous assertions do not carry the same of the speaker's relevant epistemic authoritativeness that ordinary assertions do. If this is correct, the phenomenon of anonymity provides us with a lesson regarding ordinary assertions: their aptness for engendering belief in others, and so for communicating knowledge, depends in general on the very publicness of the act of assertion itself

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Sanford Goldberg
Northwestern University

Citations of this work

Epistemic Injustice.Rachel McKinnon - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (8):437-446.
Recent Work on Assertion.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):365-380.
Unifying Group Rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:517-544.
Testimony and the Constitutive Norm of Assertion.Casey Rebecca Johnson - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):356-375.

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References found in this work

Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
Knowing and Asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489.
Must We Know What We Say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.

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