Forme della volontà e impronte di norme nella formazione della norma consuetudinaria

Noesis 34:71-88 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Custom is a complex phenomenon, and one that is hardly given a satisfying account, especially if it is assumed, as many legal positivists do, that law is only produced through acts of will. After examining five main reasons for the complexity of custom, I will consider Uberto Scarpelli’s thesis that customary law can be given an account within legal positivism through a reinterpretation of norm-generating facts as the manifestations of a will. But what kind of will is implied here, and how can the underlying norm be inferred? I will first briefly examine Gaetano Carcaterra’s analysis of abduction as a method to infer norms from behaviors, and then distinguish six different forms of will possibly implied in a behavior which is relevant for the formation of a customary norm. I will finally focus on norm-oriented, or nomotropic will, and especially on nomotrophic will, that is, the will –implied and expressed in the reaction to the violation of a norm– that the infringed norm be valid.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,503

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Sources, Recognition and the Unity of the Legal System.José de Sousa E. Brito - 2020 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 33 (1):19-33.
Sources, Recognition and the Unity of the Legal System.José de Sousa E. Brito - 2020 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 33 (1):19-33.
The new legal anti-positivism.Hasan Dindjer - 2020 - Legal Theory 26 (3):181-213.
Truth in legal norms.Boyan Bahanov - 2020 - Philosophy 29 (4):394-402.
Gli orizzonti della giustificazione.Uberto Scarpelli - 1985 - Rivista di Filosofia 76 (1):3.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-04-01

Downloads
3 (#1,705,473)

6 months
3 (#968,143)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references