Perception and neuroscience

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (March) 83 (March):83-103 (1989)
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Abstract

Perception is often analysed as a process in which causal events from the environment act on a subject to produce states in the mind or brain. The role of the subject is an increasing feature of neuroscientific and cognitive literature. This feature is linked to the need for an account of the normative aspects of perceptual competence. A holographic model is offered in which objects are presented to the subject classified according to rules governing concepts and encoded in brain function in that form. This implies that the analysis of perception must consider not only the fact that there is an interaction between the perceiving subject and the perceived object but also that the interaction is shaped by a system of concepts which the subject uses in thought and action

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Grant Gillett
University of Otago

Citations of this work

Representations and cognitive science.Grant R. Gillett - 1989 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (September):261-77.
Social causation and cognitive neuroscience.Grant R. Gillett - 1993 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (1):27–45.
The nature of concepts.Denny E. Bradshaw - 1992 - Philosophical Papers 21 (1):1-20.
Language, social ecology and experience.Grant Gillett - 1991 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (3):195 – 203.

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