Abstract

Growth in human happiness seems to do in part with insights gained through attentive emotional engagement with fictional characters and their identities. For this reason it is important to pay attention to the critique that founding ethics on what we cannot but affirm of ourselves, our identity (rationality and sociability, in Nussbaum’s reading of Aristotle), amounts to a moral elitism, excluding those who fail to meet these marks of human identity. This objection throws light on the importance of the shift towards thematizing ‘subjectivity’ in modern and contemporary philosophy. Ethics takes place at the level of the deliberating subject, intending the good. The foundational element is grasped through moral commitment and not at all ‘neutrally’, in a disengaged attitude alien to human aspirations – something disturbingly overlooked in much normative ethics today. The criteria picked out as essential to our humanity are clarifications of this commitment, and involve an attitude of inclusivity. In our own non-classical philosophical framework this needs spelling out, in a manner not made clear in Nussbaum’s ‘self-validating’ arguments, in terms of the exigencies of self-enactment and personal identity. This also answers critics who would disallow the conflation of identity and judgments of value