Narveson on Liberty and Equality

International Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (2):249-258 (2011)
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Abstract

At issue with Narveson is not the independence of persons, but an extreme form of ownership. Many people could be more independent with ownership of a moderate kind. All Narveson’s arguments depend on presupposing that extreme ownership has a special moral status.

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Allan Gibbard
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

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