Erkenntnis 86 (3):603-621 (2019)

Authors
Joaquim Giannotti
University of Birmingham
Abstract
Dispositionality and qualitativity are key notions to describe the world that we inhabit. Dispositionality is a matter of what a thing is disposed to do in certain circumstances. Qualitativity is a matter of how a thing is like. According to the Identity Theory of powers, every fundamental property is at once dispositional and qualitative, or a powerful quality. Canonically, the Identity Theory holds a contentious identity claim between a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity. In the literature, this view faces a contradiction objection that undermines its merits. We should therefore consider an alternative version that does not embrace the identity claim. My aim is to show that we can enjoy the benefits of the Identity Theory without embracing the identity between the dispositional and the qualitative. I shall argue that a distinction between two senses of dispositionality and qualitativity serves the purpose. I will then discuss three readings of the identity claim that can be formulated in light of such a distinction. I will conclude that even if the identity were to fail in any of the suggested readings, it would be possible to hold an account of fundamental powerful qualities.
Keywords dispositionalism  categoricalism  powers  fundamental properties  powerful qualities view
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2021
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-019-00122-5
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Scientific Essentialism.Brian Ellis - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.

View all 56 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Making Sense of Powerful Qualities.Ashley Coates - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8347-8363.
Grounding Theories of Powers.Matthew Tugby - 2021 - Synthese 198 (12):11187-11216.
New Powers for Dispositionalism.Giacomo Giannini - 2020 - Synthese (ST: New Foundations for Disposit):1-30.
Powerful Problems for Powerful Qualities.Henry Taylor - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):425-433.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Powerful Qualities and Pure Powers.Henry Taylor - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1423-1440.
Powerful Qualities or Pure Powers?Gabriele Contessa - 2019 - Metaphysica 20 (1):5-33.
Is Identity Really so Fundamental?Décio Krause & Jonas R. Becker Arenhart - 2019 - Foundations of Science 24 (1):51-71.
The Regress of Pure Powers?Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):513–534.
Dispositionalism, Categoricalism, and Metaphysical Naturalism.Travis Dumsday - 2014 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 88:101-112.
I—Fundamental Powers, Evolved Powers, and Mental Powers.Alexander Bird - 2018 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1):247-275.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-03-08

Total views
403 ( #24,146 of 2,499,299 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
43 ( #19,870 of 2,499,299 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes