Religious Democracy and the Liberal Principle of Legitimacy

Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2):135-68 (2009)
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Abstract

I argue against Rawls's claim that the liberal principle of legitimacy would be selected in the original position in addition to a democratic principle. Since a religious democracy could satisfy the democratic principle, the parties in the original position would not exclude it as illegitimate.

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2009-04-30

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Simon Căbulea May
Florida State University

Citations of this work

Shared intentions, public reason, and political autonomy.Blain Neufeld - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):776-804.
Coercion and public justification.Colin Bird - 2014 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (3):189-214.
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High Stakes Instrumentalism.John Halstead - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):295-311.
Democratic Legitimacy, Legal Expressivism, and Religious Establishment.Simon Căbulea May - 2012 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15 (2):219-238.

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