Free will as a higher‐level phenomenon?

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):177-187 (2020)
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Abstract

List (2014, 2019) has recently argued for a particular view of free will as a higher-level phenomenon compatible with determinism. According to List, one could refute his account by showing that determinism at the physical level implies the impossibility of doing otherwise at the agential level. This paper takes up that challenge. Based on assumptions to which List’s approach is committed, I provide a simple probabilistic model that establishes the connection between physical determinism and the impossibility of doing otherwise at the agential level that is needed to refute free will as a higher-level phenomenon.

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Alexander Gebharter
Marche Polytechnic University

Citations of this work

Sellars on compatibilism and the consequence argument.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (7):2361-2389.
Causal emergence from effective information: Neither causal nor emergent?Joe Dewhurst - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):158-168.
Determination from Above.Kenneth Silver - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):237-251.

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References found in this work

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.
Why Free Will is Real.Christian List - 2019 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Physicalism, or Something near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):306-310.

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