A pragmatic approach to explanations

Philosophy of Science 47 (3):404-423 (1980)
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Abstract

It is argued that it is not sufficient to consider only the sentences included in the explanans and explanandum when determining whether they constitute an explanation, but these sentences must always be evaluated relative to a knowledge situation. The central criterion on an explanation is that the explanans in a non-trivial way increases the belief value of the explanandum, where the belief value of a sentence is determined from the given knowledge situation. The outlined theory of explanations is applied to some well-known examples and is also compared to other theories of explanation

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