The structure of physical explanation

Philosophy of Science 47 (2):203-226 (1980)
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Abstract

Some features of physical science relevant for a discussion of physical explanation are mentioned. The D-N account of physical explanation is discussed, and it is seen to restrict the scope of explanation in physical science because it imposes the requirement that the explanandum must be deducible from the explanans. Analysis shows that an alternative view of scientific explanation, called the instance view, allows a wider range of physical explanations. The view is seen to be free from a certain class of counter examples to the D-N theory

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Author's Profile

John Forge
University College, London (Alumnus)

Citations of this work

Scientific explanation: A critical survey.Gerhard Schurz - 1995 - Foundations of Science 1 (3):429-465.
The instance theory of explanation.John Forge - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (2):127 – 142.
Theoretical explanation in physical science.John Forge - 1985 - Erkenntnis 23 (3):269 - 294.

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References found in this work

Philosophy of Natural Science.Carl G. Hempel - 1967 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):70-72.
Why Ask, "Why?"? An Inquiry concerning Scientific Explanation.Wesley C. Salmon - 1978 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 51 (6):683 - 705.
Hempel and Oppenheim on explanation.Rolf Eberle, David Kaplan & Richard Montague - 1961 - Philosophy of Science 28 (4):418-428.
Explanation revisited.David Kaplan - 1961 - Philosophy of Science 28 (4):429-436.
Realist foundations of measurement.Henry C. Byerly & Vincent A. Lazara - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (1):10-28.

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