Abstract

Two opposing uses of the term ‘Scientific Ontology’ reflect attitudes towards the relation between science and philosophical ontology. On the one side we can try to understand the broader picture by looking at the empirical details. On the other side we can try to find overarching principles that explain our observations. I am deeply aware of the history of this subject but—as we all know—history repeats itself. Perhaps it is time now for, actually, deduction to take more place in science. Perhaps—which of course is my own belief—we have reached the end of the road of so much depending on empirical observations. The natural sciences have reached beyond what is possible to empirically detect. My own research is an attempt to redefine our ontological starting point and to really test if the world only is physical. In this Reply I put Tambassi’s reply in the explicit context of my definition of scientific ontology. The outcome is that scientific ontology cannot settle the debate in the geographical sciences as to whether the geographical world is mind-dependent or not, but that the geographical universe, in that case, as a universe, belongs to the domain of scientific ontology.