Abstract
In my book, The Language of Time, it was argued that the distinctions of past, present and future are objective. The over-all structure of the argument was as follows: ‘now’, as well as other temporal demonstratives, although not designating a sensible property, has an informative role in our language, and for this reason temporal demonstratives cannot be eliminated without loss of information; ‘now’ is “semantically” objective but “pragmatically” subjective, i.e. a sentence containing a word such as ‘now’ is not used to refer to any mental event or linguistic tokening of itself, but the rules controlling the use of such a sentence for making a true statement do specify that a specific kind of temporal relation must obtain between the tokening event and the event reported by the statement made through this tokening event; the use of ‘now’ is not selective, picking out some moment of time or class of simultaneous events from amongst others that might have been designated in its place; and, the realistic commitments of ordinary language or common-sense concerning ‘now’ are not, and could not be, inconsistent with any empirical fact or physical theory. Points -, taken in conjunction, go a long way toward establishing that there is nothing mind-dependent or linguocentric about now, that events could be past, present and future and change in respect to these distinctions even in a world devoid of perceivers or language-users.