Deductive Intuitions and Lay Rationality

Journal of Philosophical Research 39:1-15 (2014)
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Abstract

This is a discussion of L. Jonathan Cohen’s argument against the possibility that empirical psychological research might show that lay deductive competence is inconsistent. I argue that, within the framework Cohen provides, the consistency of lay deductive practice is indeterminate.

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David Galloway
King's College London

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