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The neural underpinnings of self and other and layer 2 of the shared circuits model
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):25-26 (2008)
Abstract
Differentiating self from other has been investigated at the neural level, and its incorporation into the model proposed Hurley is necessary for the model to be complete. With an emphasis on the feed-forward model in layer 2, we examine the role that self and other disruptions, including auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs), may have in expanding the model proposed by HurleyMy notes
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References found in this work
Thought as action: Inner speech, self-monitoring, and auditory verbal hallucinations.Simon R. Jones & Charles Fernyhough - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):391-399.
The sense of agency: A philosophical and empirical review of the “Who” system.Frédérique de Vignemont & Pierre Fourneret - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):1-19.
Where in the brain is the self?Todd E. Feinberg & Julian Paul Keenan - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):671-678.
Deluding the motor system.Sarah-Jayne Blakemore - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):647-655.
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