Abstract

Minority peoples are often thought to pose a threat to social unity. If one conceives of states as held together by affective identity, then the existence of multiple peoples within a state suggests that citizens have dangerously divided political loyalties. If one conceives of social unity as founded on an 'overlapping consensus' or some agreement on a few specified moral principles, peoples' claims to self-determination look no less threatening. The very fact that a people wants self-determination suggests that its members might not consider themselves to be part of the consensus. This thesis argues that both of these conceptions of unity are too strong. Social unity is the result of neither identity nor consensus but of a web of multiple partial agreements and affective identities between different groups of citizens. From this standpoint minority peoples demanding self-determination look less threatening. ;There are additional normative reasons why peoples should be allowed self-determination. First, individual autonomy can sometimes be furthered. Second, allowing a people a modicum of self-determination might satisfy its members' needs for recognition. Finally, allowing peoples to determine their own laws can serve to promote democratic participation and decision-making. ;Federalism is one way of allowing peoples self-determination. Commonly this is thought to exclude territorially dispersed groups. However, it is possible to rethink federalism along non-territorial lines, allowing dispersed peoples to retain control over specific legal realms--family law, inheritance law, and, to some extent, education. ;To illustrate and clarify these arguments, two examples are discussed in detail. Muslims in India provide an example of a non-territorial legal regime. Although there are problems with the way it is implemented, Muslims already have a separate law of marriage and divorce from Hindus and others in India. Also discussed are fundamentalists in the American South who want the option to pull their children from classes they deem to be objectionable. It should be possible to meet some of the fundamentalists' demands without sacrificing the basics of democratic education. In both cases moral compromise with the dissenting people is possible without irreparably undermining social unity.