Embodied Judgment in Hannah Arendt: From Boethius and Huck Finn to Transnational Feminisms

PhaenEx 9 (2):64-87 (2014)
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Abstract

Feminists have found Arendt helpful in articulating a theory of judgment across cultural differences. Embodiment enters this discussion, usually, through attention to enlarged mentality. In contrast, I approach embodiment and judgment by looking at undertheorized connections with Arendt’s conception of “thinking.” Drawing on a discussion of Boethius and Huckleberry Finn, I suggest that persons are led to thinking by lived contradictions, that is, by instances in which their experiences cannot be interpreted through dominant norms in their society or culture. I also consider a claim that oppression hinders a person’s ability to be receptive to enlarged mentality, thus making it difficult for oppressed persons in Third World contexts to exercise judgment. In response, I examine how an oppressed person is receptive to meaning-making through negotiating lived contradictions.

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Katy Fulfer
University of Waterloo

References found in this work

The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn.Jonathan Bennett - 1974 - Philosophy 49 (188):123-134.
Habit and Habitus.Nick Crossley - 2013 - Body and Society 19 (2-3):136-161.
Five Faces of Oppression.Iris M. Young - 1988 - Philosophical Forum 19 (4):270.

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