Abstract
This chapter explicates and critically assesses RIGHTS CORRELATIVITY. Section II addresses three core issues. The first concerns the conceptual structure of the tethered positions: does correlativity mean that the positions’ features must be symmetrical? Are correlative rights and duties the “mirror images” of one another, or not? A second issue is Existential correlativity: must the positions invariably co-obtain, or can one exist with the other(s)? Can there be a right without a correlative duty, and vice versa? A third issue concerns Justificational correlativity: must all correlative relationships be explained in terms of one position grounding the other(s)? Is it always the case that A’s right is the reason for B’s duty, the basis for imposing a duty on B in the first place? Section III then demonstrates how Wesley Hohfeld’s understanding of rights correlativity motivated all of the novel features in his schema of jural relations, some of which I defend from criticisms.