Abstract

This paper reflects on a simple, ingenious and celebrated result by Amartya Sen, ‘The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal’ (1970). Sen’s result, sometimes called the 'Liberal Paradox', has attracted — particularly in the years soon after its publication — a vast literature, including responses and reflections from Sen himself. Much of the literature involves attempts to ‘escape’ the Liberal Paradox by proposing ways to avoid or resolve the problem it seems to identify. But despite the extensive attention, and perhaps a sense among philosophers in related areas that the result is somehow relevant to liberalism or to political philosophy in general, it is still not clear why the result matters philosophically. I am sceptical about the significance of the Liberal Paradox: in this paper, I articulate various ways in which political philosophers might be urged to care about the Paradox, and argue that each of them is either implausible or of only moderate interest.