Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):113-114 (1997)
| Abstract |
The mechanisms invoked to demonstrate how self-deception can occur without intention or awareness imply that self-deceptive beliefs are nevertheless the outcome of inappropriate and often egoistically driven processes. In contrast, models of pragmatic reasoning suggest that self-deception may well be the “reasonable” output of a more generalized, adaptive approach to hypothesis testing.
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| DOI | 10.1017/s0140525x97340035 |
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