Collapsing strong emergence’s collapse problem

European Journal for Philosophy of Science 14 (2):1-24 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is impossible to deduce the properties of a strongly emergent whole from a complete knowledge of the properties of its constituents, according to C. D. Broad, when those constituents are isolated from the whole or when they are constituents of other wholes. Elanor Taylor proposes the Collapse Problem. Macro-level property p supposedly emerges when its micro-level components combine in relation r. However, each component has the property that it can combine with the others in r to produce p. Broad’s nondeducibility criterion is not met. This article argues that the amount of information required for r is physically impossible. Strong Emergence does not collapse. But the Collapse Problem does. Belief in Strong Emergence is strongly warranted. Strong Emergence occurs whenever it is physically impossible to deduce how components, in a specific relation, would combine to produce a whole with p. Almost always, that is impossible. Strong Emergence is ubiquitous. Word counts.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,891

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Power Emergentism and the Collapse Problem.Elanor Taylor - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (2):302-318.
Emergence reinflated.Alexander Skiles - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):833-842.
Must strong emergence collapse?Umut Baysan & Jessica Wilson - 2017 - Philosophica 91 (1):49--104.
Duplication and Collapse.Amir Arturo Javier-Castellanos - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):196-202.
The parts and the whole: Collapse theories and systems with identical constituents.GianCarlo Ghirardi - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 44 (1):40-47.
Kim on Emergence.Sydney Shoemaker - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):53-63.
Emergent Causal Laws and Physical Laws.Ranpal Dosanjh - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):622-635.
Collapsing Emergence.Elanor Taylor - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):732-753.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-05-16

Downloads
3 (#1,732,180)

6 months
3 (#1,207,367)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

J. M. Fritzman
Lewis & Clark College

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.
Studies in the logic of explanation.Carl Gustav Hempel & Paul Oppenheim - 1948 - Philosophy of Science 15 (2):135-175.
Parts of Classes.David K. Lewis - 1991 - Mind 100 (3):394-397.
The Mind and its place in nature.C. D. Broad - 1925 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 103:145-146.
Emergent properties.Timothy O'Connor - 1994 - American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (2):91-104.

View all 28 references / Add more references