The Intransparency of Parentheticalism

Erkenntnis 89 (5):2057-2069 (2024)
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Abstract

It has frequently been observed that typical utterances of the form “I believe that P” are assertions of the embedded proposition P. Yet that the matrix clause “I believe that” should be semantically idle creates an interesting puzzle: linguistic orthodoxy holds that the utterance is an assertion about one’s doxastic state, not about the content of this state. In response to the puzzle, Tim Henning has recently proposed a new semantic theory, parentheticalism, according to which “S believes that P” expresses P from S’s point of view: the at-issue content in belief ascriptions is the embedded proposition P. The puzzle is then claimed to be resolved as follows: as speaker and doxastic subject are identical in the first-person case, “I believe that P” expresses P from the speaker’s own point of view. In this paper, I argue, first, that parentheticalism is highly doubtful and, second, that even if parentheticalism were true, it would be unable to resolve the transparency puzzle.

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Reasons and ‘because’.Wolfgang Freitag - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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