Abstract

Collingwood's thesis that our knowledge is based on fundamental principles called absolute presuppositions has been both influential and controversial. These fundamental presuppositions are neither verifiable nor falsifiable but give rise to a series of questions and answers that constitute the body of our scientific knowledge. This, however, leads to a problem: if our knowledge is based on groups or 'constellations' of absolute presuppositions, then the result would seem to be a thoroughgoing relativism. Stephen Toulmin argues persuasively for this thesis. Thus, he claims that Collingwood's logic of question and answer leads directly to relativism and two undesirable consequences: scientific traditions falling under different constellations of absolute presuppositions are incommensurable; this incommensurability results in the loss of rationality in science, since rationality for Collingwood would seem to exist only within a constellation of absolute presuppositions and not between differing constellations. ;In opposition to this I argue for three basic points. For Toulmin, Collingwood's relativism stems from an overly-systematic portrayal of intellectual systems; but this neglects the role of the question in Collingwood's logic. Relativism also implies the inability to relate and compare different historical positions; but Collingwood is able to do this by means of his scale of forms. Toulmin's charge of relativism depends on an interpretation of Collingwood from the standpoint of a theory of process that Collingwood explicitly repudiates. ;My conclusion is that Collingwood's logic of question and answer, when taken in conjunction with the scale of forms, provides an illuminating account of scientific change without the loss of rationality. Positions can be compared and related directly without the need for a trans-historical absolute