inadvertence And Responsibility

Studies in Social Justice:1-15 (2008)
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Abstract

Against the view of certain philosophers, such as Thomas Nagel, I defend the common sense belief that people are not morally responsible for what they do or bring about inadvertently. I consider what response we might reasonably expect from a person who inadvertently does or brings about some event or condition that is manifestly undesirable or bad; and I suggest that we might reasonably expect such a person not to feel guilty but, rather, to feel embarrassed by his or her inability to prevent or avoid that condition or event.

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Harry G. Frankfurt
Princeton University

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Good Intentions and the Road to Hell.Sarah K. Paul - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (2):40-54.

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