An evolutionary cognitive neuroscience perspective on human self-awareness and theory of mind

Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):47 – 68 (2008)
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Abstract

The evolutionary claim that the function of self-awareness lies, at least in part, in the benefits of theory of mind (TOM) regained attention in light of current findings in cognitive neuroscience, including mirror neuron research. Although certain non-human primates most likely possess mirror self-recognition skills, we claim that they lack the introspective abilities that are crucial for human-like TOM. Primate research on TOM skills such as emotional recognition, seeing versus knowing and ignorance versus knowing are discussed. Based upon current findings in cognitive neuroscience, we provide evidence in favor of an introspection-based simulation theory account of human mindreading.

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Author Profiles

Farah Focquaert
University of Ghent
Johan Braeckman
University of Ghent